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THE METHODOLOGICAL MIDDLE 
GROUND: FINDING AN 
ADEQUACY STANDARD IN 
ALASKA’S EDUCATION CLAUSE 
CHRIS LOTT 
In Moore v. State, the plaintiffs argued that the state constitution 
promises each child in Alaska an adequate education.  This Note 
suggests that there is support for finding an adequacy standard in 
the Education Clause of the Alaska Constitution, and it urges an 
approach firmly grounded in Alaskan precedent and educational 
exigencies which are necessary to meet the unique educational 
needs of the state. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Framers of the Alaska Constitution envisioned that “[t]he 
legislature shall by general law establish and maintain a system of 
public schools open to all children of the State . . . .”1  The vision 
was a fairly simple one, placing control over education in the hands 
of the legislature and opening the schools to all children of the 
state.  The simplicity of the clause has nonetheless left many 
unanswered questions.  Does every Alaskan school-age child have 
a right to an education?  If so, how specific is that right?  Do 
Alaskan children have the right to a school in their hometown?  Do 
they have a right to a certain standard of education?  Or must the 
State merely establish and maintain something that resembles a 
school?  Do those schools have to achieve certain outcomes, such 
as preparing students to operate in society? 
The Alaska Supreme Court has settled some of these 
questions.  It is clear that Alaskan school-age children have a right 
to an education and that the legislature has a concomitant duty to 
provide that education.2  It is also clear that the right is not 
boundless.  Alaskan children, for instance, do not have the right to 
 
 1. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1 (“Education Clause”). 
 2. Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys. (Molly Hootch), 536 P.2d 793, 
799 (Alaska 1975). 
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have a school in their hometown.3  Schools do not have to be 
uniform, either.4  Beyond that, however, most of the constitutional 
questions dealing with the Education Clause have been left 
unanswered.5 
Moore v. State6 seeks to clarify one of the uncertainties arising 
out of the Education Clause.7  The plaintiffs in Moore asked the 
trial court to find that the Education Clause promises every school-
age child in Alaska an adequate education and that the State has 
deprived them of this right by underfunding the schools.8  In effect, 
the plaintiffs are asking the court to interpret the constitution to 
promise not only schools “open to all,”9 but also schools of a 
certain quality that provide a certain standard of education to 
every student in the state.  The plaintiffs look largely to court 
decisions handed down in other states holding that each child has a 
constitutional right to an adequate education.10  The State has duly 
responded that the Education Clause promises students only a 
minimally adequate education.11  Qualitative educational decisions 
should be made by educators and elected officials, the State argues, 
not the courts.12 
This Note lays out a middle ground between the approaches 
urged by the plaintiffs and by the State.  Principally, it argues that 
 
 3. Id. at 804. 
 4. Id. at 803 (“Unlike most state constitutions, the Constitution of Alaska 
does not require uniformity in the school system.”). 
 5. Cf. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d 391 (Alaska 
1997) (involving an equal protection challenge to the state’s funding system). 
 6. No. 3AN-04-9756 Civ. (Alaska Super. Ct. filed Aug. 9, 2004).   
 7. At the time this Note was finalized, the case was undecided.  Oral 
arguments ended on December 20, 2006, and a decision by the trial court was set 
to be rendered within six months of that date.  Because of the gravity of the issue, 
the author believes that the case will almost certainly be heard by the supreme 
court in the near future.  This Note outlines both sides of the argument and offers 
an analysis of how the court might approach this issue. 
 8. Second Amended Complaint at 1–2, Moore (filed Dec. 3, 2004) 
[hereinafter Second Amended Complaint]. 
 9. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
 10. As explained more fully below, the plaintiffs argue that there should be an 
adequacy standard in the constitution for two reasons: (1) other states have found 
adequacy standards that are consistent with contemporary educational necessities 
in Alaska and (2) by reference to the North Carolina Supreme Court’s use of the 
state’s policy decisions.  Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief at 11–14, Moore (filed Sept. 22, 
2006) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief]. 
 11. State’s Trial Brief at 7, Moore v. State, No. 3AN-04-9756 Civ. (Alaska 
Super. Ct. filed Sept. 22, 2006) [hereinafter State’s Trial Brief]. 
 12. Id. at 9–10. 
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an adequacy standard above and beyond a minimally adequate 
education can, but by no means must, be found in the Education 
Clause.  It should not, however, be found on the terms proposed by 
the plaintiffs, who advocate either adopting the standards created 
by other states or using current educational policy to determine 
what the constitution requires.13  Instead, the approach should be, 
as suggested below, grounded in Alaskan precedent, principally the 
interpretive framework established by the Alaska Supreme Court 
in Molly Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated School System.14  The 
trend in other states may be instructive, but the unique challenges 
facing educators in Alaska and the distinctive wording of the 
Education Clause necessitate a state-specific solution.15 
Part I begins by offering an overview of school-finance 
litigation across the country.  Part II then explains the specific 
claims and counterclaims in Moore, highlighting the plaintiffs’ and 
the State’s arguments for and against finding an adequacy standard 
in the Education Clause.  Part III examines the Molly Hootch case, 
both in respect to its holding and to the interpretive framework it 
establishes.  Its holding will be important in assessing the adequacy 
claim in Moore, but the more essential point is the interpretive 
framework the court established for defining rights and duties 
under the Education Clause.  Part IV then applies the Molly 
Hootch interpretive framework to the adequacy claim in Moore, 
pointing out some of the arguments against finding an adequacy 
standard under Molly Hootch but centering most of the effort on 
justifying why an adequacy standard should be found.  Part V 
concludes by offering some thoughts on the possibility for success 
and the consequences if an adequacy standard is found.16 
 
 13. See Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief, supra note 10, at 11–14. 
 14. 536 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1975).  For more on Molly Hootch, see infra Part III. 
 15. See Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 148 (Tenn. 1993) 
(“[T]he decisions of the courts in those jurisdictions [which have already heard 
school-funding challenges] provide little guidance in construing the reach of the 
education clause of the Tennessee Constitution . . . because the decisions by the 
courts of other states are necessarily controlled in large measure by the particular 
wording of the constitutional provisions of those state charters regarding 
education and, to a lesser extent, organization and funding.”). 
 16. As will become clear, this Note will focus solely on the adequacy question.  
Exploring whether the State has violated its constitutional duty and prescribing 
the best remedial solutions are beyond the scope of this paper and are premature.  
Since it is unclear whether the Alaska Constitution affords each child an adequate 
education, it is impossible to predict whether the State has violated this obligation 
or what the best solutions are.  Whether there is an adequacy requirement and the 
extent of constitutional adequacy must be determined first; only then can the 
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II.  OVERVIEW OF SCHOOL-FINANCE LITIGATION 
Ever since the United States Supreme Court decided Brown v. 
Board of Education,17 litigation has increasingly been used as a tool 
to achieve equal educational opportunities.18  Brown’s legal 
mandate, ordering the states to end de jure segregation of African-
American students,19 has led to years of protracted litigation, and 
the remnants of this litigation still exist today.20  However, Brown’s 
more ethereal promise, that “education is perhaps the most 
important function of state and local governments . . . which must 
be made available to all on equal terms,”21 has been the imprimatur 
for litigation in a variety of educational settings. 
School-finance lawsuits have been the most visible equal 
educational opportunities challenges.  Foreclosed on the federal 
level by San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,22 
school funding challenges have been creatures of state 
constitutional law,23 and they have been brought in two separate 
waves.  Starting in the mid-1970s and lasting until the late-1980s, 
lawsuits focused primarily on the disparate allocation of resources 
that resulted from state funding formulas that relied heavily on 
local community dollars to fund public education.24  Generally, 
plaintiffs argued under state equal protection clauses that the 
 
further questions be fully examined.  Each is a highly fact-dependent inquiry not 
suitable for resolution in this Note. 
 17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 18. See John Dayton & Anne Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Who’s 
Winning the War, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2351 (2004); Charles F. Sabel & William H. 
Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 1015 (2004). 
 19. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
 20. In December 2006, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, which challenges 
the use of race in student assignment plans in public schools.  Parents Involved in 
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 05-908 (U.S., June 5, 2005),  
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/05-00908qp.pdf. 
 21. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
 22. 411 U.S. 1 (1974).  The Supreme Court held that Texas’s policy of using 
local taxes, in addition to state taxes, did not violate equal protection by 
discriminating against poor neighborhoods.  Id. at 5–6.  The Court refused to 
apply strict scrutiny when questioning how a state spends its tax money on the 
traditional state, not federal, service of public education.  Id. at 28–29, 38. 
 23. ACCESS reports that challenges to school funding have been brought in 
forty-five out of the fifty states.  National Access Network, Teachers College: 
Litigation: Overview, Columbia University, 
http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/litigation.php3 (last visited Feb. 26, 2007). 
 24. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (en banc). 
04__LOTT.DOC 6/7/2007  3:21 PM 
2007] EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 77 
education clauses in the state constitutions made education a 
fundamental right and that the state could not advance a 
compelling interest with narrowly tailored means to justify the vast 
funding disparities.25  Courts initially accepted such arguments,26 
and they provided a broad array of remedial solutions—from 
mandating the state legislature to take action to equalize funding 
between the schools27 to ordering states to comply with complex 
equalizing formulas for funding.28  By the late 1980s, however, it 
became clear that the so called “equity” cases were failing to 
achieve educational equality.29  Solutions were either too 
impractical, too politically impossible, or both.30  Courts began 
rejecting, and litigants stopped bringing, lawsuits demanding strict 
equity in resource allocation.31 
The failure of equity lawsuits led to a new era of equal 
educational opportunity litigation focusing on adequacy 
 
 25. See, e.g., Serrano, 487 P.2d. at 1255; see also Dayton & Dupre, supra note 
18, at 2359–60 (overview of Serrano principle).  Another common argument that 
courts accepted was that there was simply no rational basis for large funding 
disparities.  For instance, in Tennessee Small School District v. McWherter, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court held that the State’s choice to leave funding to 
individual communities was not even rationally related to its asserted goal—more 
local control over education—because the disparate allocation of funds actually 
took local control away from some communities who did not have enough funds 
to provide basic educational necessities.  851 S.W.2d 139, 154–55 (Tenn. 1993). 
 26. See, e.g., Serrano, 487 P.2d. at 1255; see also Dayton & Dupre, supra note 
18, at 2359–60. 
 27. See Michael A. Rebell, Educational Adequacy, Democracy, and the 
Courts, in ACHIEVING HIGH EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ALL: CONFERENCE 
SUMMARY 218, 225 (Timothy Ready, Christopher Edley, Jr. & Catherine E. Snow 
eds., 2002), available at 
http://www.schoolfunding.info/resource_center/research/adequacychapter.pdf  
(discussing the fiscal neutrality principal). 
 28. Other examples of courts finding for the plaintiffs in equity cases include: 
Dupree v. Alma School District No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Horton v. 
Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); and Washakie County School District No. 1 v. 
Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).  For a detailed discussion of the equity cases, 
see Rebell, supra note 27, at 226–27.  See generally Dayton & Dupre, supra note 
18. 
 29. See Rebell, supra note 27, at 227. 
 30. See id. (“Equalizing tax capacity does not by itself equalize education.  
The educationally relevant disparities not only reflect the tax based inequalities, 
but local political and administrative choices as well . . . .” (quoting Peter Enrich, 
Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. 
REV. 101, 147 (1995))). 
 31. See id. (reporting that by 1988, of the twenty-two states which had heard 
equity cases, fifteen ruled for the defendants). 
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standards.32  The ultimate goals of adequacy lawsuits are still 
exposure and amelioration of resource inequalities.33  However, 
adequacy litigation takes a more nuanced approach, focusing on 
three questions.34  The first two, around which this Note will be 
centered, deal primarily with the question of educational outcomes.  
First, litigants ask the court to recognize that the Education Clause 
confers on each child in the state a broad right to a certain level of 
education—adequate education.35  The broad right to education 
may be found in the constitutional text,36 or it may be found 
implicitly by reference to the commonly-held notion that every 
child has the constitutional right to an education that will prepare 
him to be a productive member of the democracy.37  For instance, 
in Leandro v. State,38 the North Carolina Supreme Court used a 
 
 32. See id. at 228; Dayton & Dupre, supra note 18, at 2391 (“Law and finance 
scholars have documented a trend in school funding cases that has moved from a 
focus on equity to an increased focus on adequacy in funding litigation.”); Charles 
F. Sabel, Destabilizing Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 1015, 1027 (2004) (“[T]he new accountability approach is widely regarded as 
the most promising recent development in public school reform.”). 
 33. E.g., Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief, supra note 10, at 1–4. 
 34. Some argue that the adequacy approach has a higher potential for success 
than equity cases.  See Rebell, supra note 27, at 230 (“[T]he marked trend toward 
plaintiff victories . . . can be directly correlated to a greater reliance . . . on claims 
of a denial of basic educational opportunities guaranteed by the applicable state 
constitution . . . .”).  But see Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of 
Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2417, 2450 (2004) (“Critical to litigation efforts is that 
these variables are located deeper inside schools and classrooms and, as such, 
further away from the reach of lawsuits and court decisions.” (emphasis added)). 
 35. Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief, supra note 10, at 11. 
 36. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“It is the paramount duty of the state 
to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its 
borders, without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or 
sex.”).  In Seattle School District No. 1 v. State, the Supreme Court of Washington 
held that the Education Clause did indeed promise every child an adequate 
education.  585 P.2d 71, 94 (Wash. 1978) (en banc) (“[T]he State’s constitutional 
duty . . . embraces broad educational opportunities needed in the contemporary 
setting to equip our children for their role as citizens and as potential competitors 
in today’s market as well as in the marketplace of ideas.”). 
 37. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973) (defining the 
promise of a “thorough and efficient” education to mean “that educational 
opportunity which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his 
role as citizen and as a competitor in the labor market”).  For an article detailing 
the role of language in school-funding litigation, see William E. Thro, The Role of 
Language of the State Education Clauses in School Finance Litigation, 79 ED. LAW 
REP. 19 (1993). 
 38. 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997). 
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number of factors—previous court decisions, the explicit guaranty 
of the constitutional provisions, and the contemporary policy 
judgments of the legislature—to find that the state’s constitution 
promises every student the opportunity to receive “sound basic 
education.”39 
Second, adequacy litigants urge that the broad standard must 
have some substance, answering the essential question: what skills 
should an educated student learn?40  In Leandro, the court defined 
a sound basic education in the following way: 
(1) sufficient ability to read, write, and speak the English 
language and a sufficient knowledge of fundamental 
mathematics and physical science to enable the student to 
function in a complex and rapidly changing society; (2) sufficient 
fundamental knowledge of geography, history, and basic 
economic and political systems to enable the student to make 
informed choices . . . ; (3) sufficient academic and vocational 
skills to enable the student to successfully engage in post-
secondary education or vocational training; and (4) sufficient 
academic and vocational skills to enable the student to compete 
on an equal basis with others in further formal education or 
gainful employment in contemporary society.41 
In the final step, adequacy litigants attempt to prove that not 
every student in the state is receiving an adequate education.42  
Disparities in the allocation of educational resources, the argument 
typically goes, have deprived many students of the right to an 
adequate education, and the State must ameliorate the disparities 
to ensure that every student is educated adequately.43  To be sure, 
 
 39. Id. at 254. 
 40. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief, supra note 10, at 11–12. 
 41. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 255; see Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 
S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989). 
 42. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief, supra note 10, at 12–14. 
 43. See, e.g., Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 391 (N.C. 
2004) (“[W]e affirm those portions of the trial court’s order that . . . require the 
State to assess its education-related allocations to the county’s schools so as to 
correct any deficiencies that presently prevent the county from offering its 
students the opportunity to obtain a Leandro-conforming education.”); Second 
Amended Complaint, supra note 8, at 2 (“[T]he [S]tate of Alaska . . . has failed 
consistently and repeatedly to adequately fund [education].  As a result, students 
with special needs of all kinds find those needs unmet, exceptional children 
receive unexceptional instruction, some children receive no instruction although 
instruction is required, and a myriad of children for a myriad of reasons fail 
examinations . . . .”). 
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perfect equality is not the goal of adequacy litigation.44  Courts 
accepting adequacy challenges have expressly recognized that their 
states’ constitutions do not mandate strict equality.45 
III.  MOORE V. STATE 
In August of 2004, a number of rural school districts, parents 
of school-age children, and educational organizations filed an 
adequacy lawsuit, Moore v. State,46 charging that the State of 
Alaska inadequately funds the education system and consequently 
deprives every school-age child in the state of a constitutionally 
adequate education.47  The plaintiffs alleged rampant educational 
inequalities, especially among low-income students and Alaska 
Natives, who had a forty-three percent graduation rate in 2004–
2005.48  The cause of the disparities, according to the plaintiffs, is 
the State’s reluctance to fund programs that would help all students 
succeed, such as preschool, one-on-one tutoring, small group 
lessons, and highly trained staff.49  The plaintiffs asked the trial 
court to conduct a study of the costs of an adequate education and 
to order the State to comply with its constitutional duty to provide 
an adequate education.50 
The State disagreed with the plaintiffs’ assertions.51  According 
to state officials, schools are not only fully funded, as evidenced by 
sharp increases in funds in the 1980s and between 2004–2007,52 but 
students also perform well on standardized tests.53  The State did 
admit to room for improvement, but it argued that its methods and 
educational approaches—which are consistent with the Federal No 
Child Left Behind Act54—are best suited to achieve the educational 
goals of the state.55  Finally, the State alleged that more funding 
 
 44. See Rebell, supra note 27, at 230–31 (explaining that adequacy litigation 
does not threaten local control over education, thus leaving local communities 
free to augment educational spending). 
 45. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 256–57. 
 46. Moore v. State, No. 3AN-04-9756 Civ. (Alaska Super. Ct. filed Aug. 9, 
2004).   
 47. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 8, at 2. 
 48. Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief, supra note 10, at 3. 
 49. Id. at 3–4. 
 50. Katie Pesznecker, Case Rests with Judge on Schools, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, Dec. 20, 2006. 
 51. See Amended Answer, Moore (filed Feb. 14, 2005). 
 52. State’s Trial Brief, supra note 11, at 2–3. 
 53. Id. at 3. 
 54. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006). 
 55. State’s Trial Brief, supra note 11, at 4–6. 
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would not solve the problem,56 arguing that evidence from other 
states demonstrates that more money alone is not the answer.57  
Rather, the State suggested that the money that has been allocated 
must be spent more efficiently and effectively.58 
Each side has a different position on the question of whether 
and what level of adequacy is required by the Education Clause.59  
The plaintiffs urged the court to find an adequacy standard in one 
of two places.  First, the plaintiffs suggested that the court should 
adopt a detailed adequacy standard similar to the one articulated 
by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Rose v. Council for Better 
Education.60  The apparent justification for adopting such a position 
is that “numerous other courts have adopted similar definitions.”61  
The standard would require that each student receive: 
i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable 
students to function in a complex and rapidly changing 
civilization; ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and 
political systems to enable the student to make informed choices; 
iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable 
the student to understand the issues that affect his or her 
community, state, and nation; iv) sufficient self-knowledge and 
knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; v) 
sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to 
appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; vi) 
sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either 
academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose 
and pursue life work intelligently; and vii) sufficient levels of 
academic or vocational skills to enable public school students to 
compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, 
in academics or in the job market.62 
In the alternative, the plaintiffs analogized to the North Carolina 
Supreme Court’s decision in Leandro v. State and suggested that 
the court look to education goals and standards within the state to 
find an adequacy standard: “As Leandro demonstrates, even if this 
court is not inclined to adopt Alaska’s state standards as a 
constitutional minimum, they are nevertheless evidence of what all 
 
 56. Id. at 6–7. 
 57. See id. at 10–11. 
 58. Id. 
 59. In response to a pretrial motion, the trial court made clear that it will 
make a decision on the adequacy question.  Order re: State’s Motion to Establish 
a Standard of Review at 4, Moore v. State, No. 3AN-04-9756 Civ. (filed June 13, 
2006) [hereinafter Order] (“This court finds that it is the court’s responsibility to 
determine ‘a constitutional floor with respect to educational adequacy. . . .’”). 
 60. 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989). 
 61. Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief, supra note 10, at 12. 
 62. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212. 
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children in today’s society need to learn to participate in society as 
adults.”63  The plaintiffs conclude that subjects such as math, 
science, geography, and government are essential to an adequate 
education and therefore should be constitutionally required.64 
The State, in contrast, argued that the state constitution 
requires only a minimally adequate education.65  “Even if a 
student’s exercise of the right to an education was ‘burdened by 
certain disadvantages,’ the existence of those disadvantages would 
not constitute a violation of the Education Clause.”66  Relying on 
the supreme court’s decision in Molly Hootch v. Alaska State-
Operated School System, the State argued that the constitution 
promises only the opportunity to receive an education.67  The State 
suggested that the court should allow the legislative and executive 
branches to do the line drawing and list making,68 leaving the 
constitution a “flexible document that is to be implemented and 
funded by the political process.”69 
IV.  MOLLY HOOTCH:  
HOLDING AND INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK 
Resolution of Moore, and specifically resolution of the 
adequacy issue, will almost certainly be made with reference to the 
Molly Hootch case.70  Molly Hootch is the Alaska Supreme Court’s 
only major elaboration of the Education Clause.71  It is also a close 
analogue to Moore, at least in respect to the broad question it 
presents: what is the extent of the rights and duties under the 
Education Clause?72  However, there are a number of key 
differences between Molly Hootch and Moore, discussed below, 
which call into question the State’s contention that Molly Hootch 
 
 63. Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief, supra note 10, at 12. 
 64. Id. 
 65. State’s Trial Brief, supra note 11, at 7. 
 66. Id. at 8 (quoting Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys., 536 P.2d 793, 
804 (Alaska 1975)). 
 67. State’s Trial Brief, supra note 11, at 8. 
 68. Id. at 10 (“Molly Hootch explicitly reserves educational policy decisions 
and line-drawing exercises for the legislative and executive branches, not the 
court.”). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys. (Molly Hootch), 536 P.2d 793, 
799 (Alaska 1975). 
 71. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
 72. Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 799 (“Appellants seek a definition of the 
constitutional provision . . . .”). 
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disposes of the adequacy question in Moore.73  Accordingly, the 
holding in Molly Hootch is less important in determining whether 
the Education Clause requires adequacy than it is for the 
interpretive framework that was established. 
A. The Holding 
In Molly Hootch, school-aged children from three isolated 
rural towns claimed that the legislature violated the Education 
Clause because it did not provide secondary schools in the 
students’ hometowns.74  Specifically, the students claimed that the 
Education Clause’s promise of public schools “open to all”75 
conferred upon all Alaskan school-age children a fundamental 
right to be educated in their hometowns, that the right could not be 
impaired unless a compelling government interest was advanced, 
and that no such interest was advanced.76  Refusing to reach the 
question of a constitutional violation, the Alaska Supreme Court 
held that the Education Clause does not promise school-age 
children in Alaska the right to be educated in their hometowns.77  
Rather, “[t]he phrase ‘open to all’ is a unitary phrase embodying a 
requirement of nonsegregated schools.”78  Each student must have 
access to a nonsegregated school, the court held, but the 
constitution says nothing about how many schools there must be or 
where they must be located.79 
The supreme court did not directly rule on the question of 
whether the constitution promises an adequate level of education.  
However, as the State’s brief in Moore points out, it did make a 
number of points that may influence the court in Moore. 80  Most 
important, the supreme court explained that, “[u]nlike most state 
constitutions, the Constitution of Alaska does not require 
uniformity in the school system.”81  Rather, “the Alaska 
Constitution appears to contemplate different types of educational 
opportunities . . . without requiring that all options be available to 
 
 73. State’s Trial Brief, supra note 11, at 7. 
 74. Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 796–97.  The students also claimed a state equal 
protection violation, but the cause was remanded for further proceedings.  Id. at 
808. 
 75. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
 76. Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 797. 
 77. Id. at 801, 803. 
 78. Id. at 801. 
 79. Id. at 803. 
 80. State’s Trial Brief, supra note 11, at 7–8. 
 81. Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 803. 
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all students.”82  The question of which students get what services is 
a complex policy question that is expressly delegated to the 
legislative and executive branches; the constitution says nothing 
about “when it is feasible to establish local secondary 
schools . . . .”83 
In this light, it is possible that, as the State argues, the trial 
court may dispose of the adequacy issue based on the holding in 
Molly Hootch alone.84  Since students merely must have the 
opportunity to attend a school,85 it follows that the standard of 
education promised to Alaskan school-age children is minimal.86  
Moreover, Molly Hootch held that educational opportunities do 
not have to be the same—the constitution contemplates that there 
will be differences, and in doing so it does not compel the State to 
promise each child the same educational outcome.87  Finally, 
finding an adequacy standard in the Education Clause may well 
usurp the province, expressly recognized in Molly Hootch, of the 
legislative and executive branches to make policy.88 
The better conclusion, however, is that there are enough 
differences between Molly Hootch and Moore to make such a 
cursory disposition of the adequacy issue unlikely.  For instance, 
that Molly Hootch promised mere opportunities, not guaranteed 
outcomes, does not preclude a court from holding that the 
Education Clause promises every student a basic standard of 
education.  A court may decide that every student has the absolute 
right to receive an adequate education; or, a court may decide that 
every student must have the opportunity to receive that sort of 
education.  Either way, the standard of education that must be 
offered is the same, and therefore opportunity is not incompatible 
with adequacy.89 
Furthermore, an adequacy standard is consistent with Molly 
Hootch’s holding that differences in the quality and type of 
education are constitutional.  As the trial court recognized in a 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 804. 
 84. See State’s Trial Brief, supra note 11, at 7. 
 85. Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 803. 
 86. See State’s Trial Brief, supra note 11, at 7. 
 87. See id. at 9. 
 88. See id. 
 89. To this end, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has expressly held that 
the state constitution requires only the opportunity for a “sound basic education.”  
Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997) (“We conclude 
that . . . the North Carolina Constitution . . . guarantee[s] every child of this state 
an opportunity to receive a sound basic education in our public schools.”). 
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pretrial order, its job is to establish a constitutional floor not 
uniform requirements making every school equal. 90  Thus, while all 
options do not have to be open to all students,91 it is possible that 
some options might still have to be available to every student.  Not 
every school has to have a swimming pool, for instance, but every 
school may have to offer an art class. 
Finally, finding an adequacy standard is not the same as 
making a policy decision.  The standard does not, as the State 
suggests, “inevitably reflect[] the policies and priorities of the list-
maker rather than the policies and priorities of the people . . . .”92  
If done properly, an adequacy standard can be found through well-
accepted methods of constitutional interpretation, reflecting the 
combined values of the Framers, the people, and contemporary 
exigencies.93  To be sure, there may be some overlap between 
policy decisions and the adequacy standard.  For instance, the 
constitution may require that every student be taught basic oral 
and writing skills, and the statutes and regulations may prescribe 
the same.  But the standards are derived in two different ways.  The 
policy choice is a conscious decision by the legislative or executive 
branch; the adequacy standard, while once a choice by the Framers, 
is an immutable constitutional value promised to every child. 
B. Analytical Framework 
Although the holding in Molly Hootch should not dispose of 
the adequacy question, the interpretive framework it established 
for defining rights under the Education Clause provides a helpful 
roadmap for determining whether and to what extent the 
constitution promises every child an adequate education.  Three 
primary interpretive principles can be gleaned from the opinion. 
The starting point is the express guaranty of the Education 
Clause.94  In construing the text, the court explained that “[t]he 
general rule . . . is to give import to every word and make none 
nugatory.”95  Second, “[the court] must look to the intent of the 
Framers of the constitution concerning the nature of the right itself, 
the problems which they were addressing and the remedies they 
sought.”96  Finally, the court recognized that the constitution “must 
 
 90. Order, supra note 59, at 4. 
 91. See Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys. (Molly Hootch), 536 P.2d 
793, 803 (Alaska 1975). 
 92. State’s Trial Brief, supra note 11, at 10. 
 93. See Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 800. 
 94. Id. at 799. 
 95. Id. at 801. 
 96. Id. at 800. 
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be construed in light of changing social conditions,” but 
nonetheless may not be interpreted such that it departs “so far 
from its original terms and meaning as to constitute a radical 
invasion by the judiciary into an area specifically delegated . . . to 
the legislature.”97 
Consistent with the approach urged by the plaintiffs,98 the 
court in Molly Hootch said that “[c]omparison of the education 
provision in the Alaska Constitution with those in other states is 
also instructive . . . .”99  Examining the Education Clauses from a 
number of other states, the court concluded that the Alaska 
Constitution is “[u]nlike most state constitutions”100 and 
accordingly distinguished the holdings of a number of other state 
courts.101 
From an interpretive standpoint, then, the plaintiffs are not 
incorrect in urging the court to examine the interpretations of 
other courts.  However, by asking the court to adopt the 
interpretation of or the approach used by another state,102 the 
plaintiffs have relied more heavily on the interpretations of other 
courts than the Molly Hootch framework permits.  In so doing, the 
plaintiffs glossed over the fact that in drafting the constitution, the 
Framers “had in mind the vast expanses of Alaska, its many 
isolated small communities which lack effective transportation and 
communication systems, and the diverse culture and heritage of its 
citizens.”103 
The Molly Hootch framework thus provides an approach 
geared toward producing a state-specific solution.  Thus, 
interpretations of other courts should be used, if at all, in a 
comparative perspective, and should merely instruct the court, not 
provide the answer.104 
 
 97. Id. at 804. 
 98. Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief, supra note 10, at 11–14. 
 99. Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d. at 801. 
 100. Id. at 803. 
 101. Id. at 802 n.28 (“Those ca[s]es which do interpret this or similar language 
are distinguishable.”). 
 102. See Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief, supra note 10, at 11–14.  For an outline of the 
arguments in Moore, see discussion supra Part II. 
 103. Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 803. 
 104. Id. at 802.  Accordingly, the decisions of other courts in adequacy litigation 
are discussed no further in this Note.  This is not to say that those decisions are 
unhelpful, but rather to say that they are unnecessary to the proper resolution of 
the adequacy question and beyond the scope of this Note.  For background on 
adequacy litigation in other states, see Dayton & Dupre, supra note 18, at 2390–
94; Richard E. Levy, Gunfight at the K-12 Corral: Legislative vs. Judicial Power in 
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V.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 
Before applying the Molly Hootch framework to the 
Education Clause, it is important to note that it is impossible to 
predict which factors the court will use to find (or not find) an 
adequacy guarantee in the constitution.  That said, a majority of 
the analysis in Molly Hootch focused on two factors—the 
Education Clause’s explicit guarantee and the historical framework 
under which it was enacted—both of which will be discussed at 
length below.  Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that, at 
this stage of the analysis, the alleged disparities in education are 
irrelevant.105  The question is: what is the scope of the constitutional 
rights and duties?  The court’s job is to define these contours.  
Once these constitutional rights are defined, alleged violations 
become pertinent.106 
A. Explicit Guarantee 
The Education Clause provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he 
legislature shall by general law establish and maintain a system of 
public schools open to all children of the State . . . .”107  On its face, 
the clause commands a specific duty of the legislative branch—the 
establishment and maintenance of public schools—and a corollary 
right to all Alaskan children to have access to those schools.108  The 
most obvious omission from the Education Clause is an explication 
of a particular standard of education that the legislature is required 
to administer.109  The legislature does not have to establish and 
 
the Kansas School Finance Litigation, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1021, 1031–34 (2006); 
and Rebell, supra note 27, at 232–39. 
 105. Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 800 (“In determining the scope of a 
constitutional right, the focus of the court’s inquiry is not, however, on the 
question of whether there is a burden on the exercise of that right.”). 
 106. Alleged violations and possible remedies are beyond the scope of this 
paper.  The remedial issue, however, has been approached from a number of 
different points of view.  Compare generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE 
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991), and Heise, 
supra note 34, at 2456–60 (casting doubt on the potential for adequacy litigation to 
bring about equal educational opportunities because plaintiffs seek to reach too 
far into the classroom), with Rebell, supra note 27, at 230 (arguing that adequacy 
litigation is more judicially manageable than equity litigation and therefore has a 
higher potential for actually achieving equal educational opportunities). 
 107. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
 108. See Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 799. 
 109. Cf. GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, para. 1 (“The provision of an adequate 
public education for the citizens shall be a primary obligation of the State of 
Georgia.”); WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (stating that “It is the paramount duty of 
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maintain an efficient, effective, or quality system of public schools; 
it merely must establish and maintain public schools.110  The 
children are simply guaranteed public schools that are “open to 
all,”111 not public schools that prepare them to compete in society 
and allow each student to go to college if he pleases.112 
The initial issue, therefore, is whether the lack of an explicit 
standard is dispositive of the adequacy issue.113  On the one hand, if 
the Framers intended to require a certain standard of educational 
quality in the constitution, they could have said so explicitly.114  The 
omission, in turn, could be considered if not evidence of a purpose 
not to include an adequacy standard, then at least evidence that it 
was not contemplated in the first place.  Indeed, such an argument 
is consistent with the general framework of the Education Clause.  
The duty placed on the legislature and the rights afforded to 
Alaskan children are, on the whole, broad and unspecific.  To this 
end, the Framers intended to delegate the authority of maintaining 
and enforcing standards to the legislature, understanding fully that 
educational standards are more suitably answered by the people’s 
 
the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within 
its borders . . . .”). 
 110. Cf. PA. CONST. art. III, § 14 (“The General Assembly shall provide for the 
maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public education to 
serve the needs of the Commonwealth.”). 
 111. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
 112. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“A general diffusion of knowledge and 
intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the 
people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of 
intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.”). 
 113. In the early 1990s, some scholars were predicting that the strength of the 
explicit wording of a state’s Education Clause would have an influential effect on 
whether or not an adequacy standard would be found.  See Thro, supra note 37, at 
22 (arguing that since historical analysis is often unclear, “the language arguably 
becomes the decisive factor”).  For instance, Thro suggested a weak clause, like 
Alaska’s, promised only a free public education and no qualitative standard.  Id. at 
28.  Thro’s hypothesis has not, however, been borne out.  Some states with what 
he characterizes as the strongest education clauses have failed to find a 
constitutional standard of adequacy, see, e.g., Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 
798 (Ill. 1999); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996), 
while other states with weaker Education Clauses have found a constitutional 
promise of adequacy, see, e.g., Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 
(S.C. 1999). 
 114. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, para. 1. 
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representatives, not in a static, transcendent constitutional 
command.115 
On the other hand, to interpret the State’s duty to provide 
public education, and Alaskan children’s right to receive that 
education, as a standardless right is to effectively render the words 
“public school” nugatory, something that the Molly Hootch court 
explicitly rejected.116  That is, “public schools open to all” 117 must 
have some meaning.118  The Framers may have delegated a 
significant amount of authority over the control of public education 
to the legislature, but the Framers nonetheless had something in 
mind when they opened the schools to all school-aged children in 
Alaska.  They must have conceived of having the basics: teachers, 
books, and classes.  They may have believed public schools should 
prepare their children to function in society.119  In short, there must 
have been some standard of education contemplated, otherwise the 
legislature could render the right to public schooling no right at 
all.120 
To this end, not every constitutional command is written 
explicitly in the constitution.  Some, undoubtedly, are found 
 
 115. In large part, this is the argument advanced by the State in its brief.  See 
State’s Trial Brief, supra note 11, at 10 (“The legislature, state board, and local 
school boards are the proper bodies to set educational goals and requirements.”); 
see also Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813, 815 (Ala. 2002) (“[B]ecause the duty to 
fund Alabama’s public schools is a duty that—for over 125 years—the people of 
this state have rested squarely upon the shoulders of the Legislature, it is the 
Legislature, not the courts, from which any further redress should be sought.”); 
Comm. for Educ. Rights, 672 N.E.2d at 1189 (“[Q]uestions relating to the quality 
of education are solely for the legislative branch to answer.”). 
 116. Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys. (Molly Hootch), 536 P.2d 793, 
801 (Alaska 1975). 
 117. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
 118. The Tennessee Supreme Court took a similar position in Tennessee Small 
School District v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993).  In responding to the 
State of Tennessee’s challenge that the word “education” had no substance, the 
court explained, “the word ‘education’ has a definite meaning and needs no 
modifiers in order to describe the precise duty imposed upon the legislature.”  Id. 
at 150.  While the Alaska Constitution does not specifically mention education, a 
similar argument could be applied to the use of public schools, which are places of 
instruction where students become prepared to be productive members of society. 
 119. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Today [education] is 
a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him 
for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his 
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be 
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.”). 
 120. See Tenn. Small Sch. Dist., 851 S.W.2d at 138–41. 
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implicitly,121 others are found historically, and still others are found 
combining these or other factors.122  The court’s job, essentially, is 
to give import to words in the constitution; that import must be 
fair, but fairness does not preclude the court from providing 
meaning to specific terms in the constitution.123  Furthermore, an 
adequacy standard does not have to be so specific that the court, in 
finding and defining the adequacy right, necessarily usurps the 
explicit delegation of authority to the legislature.  Rather, the very 
point of adequacy litigation is to move away from defining specific 
educational rights in relation to, for instance, intricate and complex 
funding formulas,124 and move toward applying broad conceptions 
of educational adequacy which apply in the past, the present, and 
the future. 
In sum, although the Framers surely meant something by the 
words “public schools open to all,”125 it is not wholly clear from the 
face of the Education Clause the standard of public schooling they 
intended.  Did they, for instance, contemplate merely a minimally 
adequate education?  Or was there a greater conception that public 
schools would operate in a particular way?  A review of the history 
is necessary to answer these questions. 
B. Historical Framework 
The touchstone of the Molly Hootch analysis is defining the 
scope of the educational right in relation to the intent of the 
Framers, the problems they were addressing, and the remedies they 
sought.126 
1. The History of Education in Alaska: Problems, Reactions, 
and Remedies Sought.  The history of education in Alaska during 
the time leading up to statehood is a tale of a segregated, dual 
school system.127  From the time the United States acquired the 
Alaska territory until the early twentieth century, education in 
 
 121. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33–34 (1973) 
(“[T]he answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or 
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.”). 
 122. See Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys. (Molly Hootch), 536 P.2d 
793, 800 (Alaska 1975). 
 123. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 124. Rebell, supra note 27, at 230. 
 125. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
 126. Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 800. 
 127. See id. (“At the time statehood was attained, a dual system of public 
education existed in Alaska.”). 
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Alaska was administered primarily by the federal government.128  In 
the early 1900s, the number of non-Natives in the territory 
increased with the discovery of gold and the growth of commercial 
fishing and timber.129  Unable to educate the growing population, 
Congress delegated the education and taxation authority to 
territorial cities and towns.130  Regional areas petitioned for local 
control as well, leading to the passage of the Nelson Act in 1905, 
which reduced federal control of education to unincorporated rural 
areas.131  The catch, however, was that only “white children and 
children of mixed blood leading a civilized life” were permitted to 
attend the schools.132  Alaska Native children in rural areas still 
attended schools operated by the federal government.133  Although 
federal government policy on how to educate Alaska Natives rode 
the pendulum away from civilization programs toward self-
determination and then back in the years leading up to statehood,134 
the federal government never relinquished total control over rural 
Alaska Native education.135 
By the 1950s, education in Alaska existed on three fronts.  In 
urban, modern, and growing towns and cities, public schools were 
operated in similar fashion to most urban centers around the 
United States.136  In the rural areas, a system of segregated schools 
still persisted.137  The federal government operated a number of 
Alaska Native elementary and secondary boarding schools, which 
 
 128. Carol Barnhardt, A History of Schooling for Alaska Native People, 40 J. 
AM. INDIAN EDUC. 1, 8–11 (2001), available at 
http://jaie.asu.edu/v40/V40I1A1.pdf. 
 129. Id. at 11. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Starting in the 1930s, John Collier initiated a series of reforms that led to 
the devolution of some of the control over Alaska Native education to the Alaska 
Territorial Board of Education.  Id. at 12.  Between 1942 and 1954, forty-six 
elementary schools controlled by the Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs were 
transferred to the territory.  Monetary concerns and the push for statehood, 
however, slowed the transfer of federally controlled schools to territorial control.  
Id. at 13–14. 
 135. Id. at 12. 
 136. Most Alaska Natives were concentrated in rural areas, and therefore 
segregated schools did not exist in urban centers.  Those Alaska Natives who did 
reside in urban areas were considered “civilized” and could attend public schools.  
Id. at 14. 
 137. Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys. (Molly Hootch), 536 P.2d 793, 
800 (Alaska 1975). 
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often overlapped with elementary and secondary schools operated 
by the Alaska Territorial Board of Education.138  As Molly Hootch 
explained, segregation was the primary problem that the Framers 
addressed in 1955 and 1956 at the Constitutional Convention.139  
The answer, of course, was to provide that the public schools would 
be “open to all” children in the new state.140  As the Hootch court 
also explained, the Framers’ intent was to promote unity in the 
school system, not uniformity.141  Recognized differences between 
rural and urban areas in the state were replete throughout the 
Constitutional Convention minutes.142  When the constitution was 
finally enacted, such differences were preserved and coveted, not 
abandoned.143 
Although the Framers were reacting to a system of segregated 
public schools that differed depending on regional location, they 
were not reacting to a completely inadequate system of schools. 
Accounts suggest that, in many respects, the schools operating in 
the Alaska territory before statehood were comparable to schools 
across the United States.  According to a report by the Department 
of Interior in 1950, “[t]eachers in the Territorial public schools 
compare favorably in training and experience with those in the 
States.”144  Accreditation was required for both teachers and 
administrators,145 and minimum salaries exceeded the national 
average.146  Furthermore, a large number of public high schools in 
the state were accredited by the Northwest Association of 
 
 138. Barnhardt, supra note 128, at 22.  (“Although some of the most harmful 
consequences of the original dual system no longer existed (i.e. there were few 
communities in which students attended separate schools on the basis of race), 
many of the other negative consequences of the dual system continued (e.g. lack 
of coordination, competition for teachers and resources, high expenses, 
duplication of services).”). 
 139. Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 801. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 803. 
 142. See, e.g., Minutes of the Alaska Constitutional Convention, Day 58 (Jan. 
19, 1956), available at http://www.law.state.ak.us/doclibrary/conconv/58.html. 
 143. See ALASKA CONST. art. X. 
 144. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF TERRITORIES, MID-CENTURY 
ALASKA (1951), 
http://www.alaskool.org/projects/history/mid_century/Mid_Century_Alaska.htm. 
 145. Id. 
 146. David Albert & David U. Levine, Teacher Satisfaction, 65 PEABODY J. 
EDUC. 47, 53 (1988).  In 1950, the average teacher salary in the United States was 
$3126. Id.  By contrast, a minimum salary law in Alaska required school boards to 
pay teachers minimum salaries ranging from $3300 to $3700, depending on the 
location.  DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 144. 
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Secondary and Higher Schools; the rest, mostly rural schools, were 
accredited by the Territorial Department of Education.147 
Alaskans also had a broad conception that schools were a tool 
to prepare the youth to contribute thoughtfully in the democracy.148  
Urban schools prepared students to work in the burgeoning fishing 
and timber industries, and more than a thousand students received 
postsecondary instruction at the University of Alaska.149  Rural 
schools, which mostly served Alaska Natives, were especially 
attuned to inculcating democratic values and preparing students to 
be an active part in the economic and social climate.150  To this end, 
the assimilationist philosophy of Alaska Native primary schools 
was centered around teaching basic English language and social 
skills in addition to the normal curriculum.151  Federally-run 
boarding schools at White Mountain and Mt. Edgecumbe went 
even further, offering vocational and college preparatory courses.152 
While not perfect, public schools in Alaska were nonetheless 
sophisticated and operated with the goal of including Alaskans, 
both Native and non-Native, in the democratic fabric of the United 
States.  The quality of public schools thus did not appear to be a 
problem that needed to be addressed by the Framers—there was at 
least a conception of what a school should look like at the time.  
That adequacy was not first on the list of problems the Framers 
had to address, of course, does not lead a fortiori to the conclusion 
that there is an implicit adequacy standard in the constitution.  It 
does, however, offer an explanation for why an explicit adequacy 
standard was not included in the constitution: the term “public 
schools” actually had meaning.  They had tangible, first-hand 
experience with how a public school operates and with what 
services it should offer its students, and such a conception was 
inherently rolled into the words “public schools” when they were 
written into the constitution. 
The point becomes clearer when contrasting the Alaska 
conception of public schools to conceptions of public schooling in 
states which enacted education clauses in the nineteenth century.  
A state such as Indiana, which enacted its Education Clause in 
1851,153 and which included illustrative descriptions of the duties 
 
 147. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 144. 
 148. See generally id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 
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and obligations of the state in providing education,154 was reacting 
to vastly different conceptions of public education.  Indeed, public 
education was nascent at most in its development in the nineteenth 
century,155 and it was not widely offered until the twentieth 
century.156  With little conception of what a system of public 
schooling should offer and achieve, states such as Indiana codified 
expectations by clarifying those requirements in the text of their 
constitutions.157  The Framers of the Alaska Constitution, in 
contrast, adopted the Education Clause during a time when the 
widely accepted contemporary purpose of education was to 
inculcate democratic values and prepare youth for success in the 
democracy.158  The Framers, furthermore, adopted the clause in a 
 
 154. Indiana’s Education Clause provides, “Knowledge and learning, generally 
diffused throughout a community, being essential to the preservation of a free 
government; it should be the duty of the General Assembly to encourage, by all 
suitable means, moral, intellectual scientific, and agricultural improvement; and 
provide, by law, for a general and uniform system of Common Schools, wherein 
tuition shall be without charge, and equally open to all.”  See also KY. CONST.        
§ 183 (“The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for an 
efficient system of common schools throughout the State.”). 
 155. Although public education has its roots in America all the way back to 
colonial times, and although educational movements began in Massachusetts in 
the nineteenth century and spread to other states, public education on a 
widespread scale is a twentieth century creation.  See VICTORIA J. DODD, 
PRACTICAL EDUCATION LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 9–10 (2003). For 
instance, even by 1910, only six percent of Americans had a high school education.  
Id. at 9. 
 156. Id. at 9–10. 
 157. To this end, of the twenty-six states which passed Education Clauses in or 
around the nineteenth century and have yet to amend the provisions, twenty  have 
enacted some sort of language qualifying the quality of education the state or 
legislature must offer, see COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (“The general assembly     
shall . . . provide for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and 
uniform system of free public schools . . . .”); DEL. CONST. Art. X, § 1 (“The 
General Assembly shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a 
general and efficient system of free public schools . . . .”), or a preamble 
highlighting the importance of education in society, see CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 
(“A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the 
preservation of the rights and liberties of the people . . . .”).  For a resource 
collecting the Education Clauses from all fifty states, see KERN ALEXANDER & M. 
DAVID ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW (6th ed. 2005). 
 158. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954): 
Today [education] is a principal instrument in awakening the child to 
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in 
helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is 
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if 
he is denied the opportunity of an education. 
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contextual environment where resources and quality teachers were 
already being provided to serve those ends.159  In this light, the 
recitation of “public schools” in the constitution had substance, and 
it is quite possible that a standard was not stated explicitly because 
there was already a widely accepted standard.160 
2. The Constitutional Minutes: The Intent of the Framers?  If 
an implicit standard was in fact adopted, one would expect the 
Framers to have at least mulled over similar standards at the 
Constitutional Convention.  Unfortunately, the Education Clause 
was seldom, if ever, discussed at the Constitutional Convention.161  
As one historian of the convention noted, “the [Education Clause] 
was not controversial,”162 and therefore consumed very little floor 
time.163  What little can be gleaned from the minutes of the 
Constitutional Convention make it clear that the Framers had two 
express goals in enacting the Education Clause.164  The first dealt 
with means: to delegate to the legislature broad authority to 
administer the public schools.165  The second dealt with ends: the 
 
The social benefit theory of education was not a new creature in the twentieth 
century.  For centuries, education has been seen as a tool to prepare young men 
and women to operate in society.  See Education, the Balance-Wheel of Social 
Machinery, Horace Mann’s Twelfth Report, AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 29 
(6th ed. 2005). 
Under the Providence of God, our means of education are the grand 
machinery by which the “raw material” of human nature can be worked 
up into inventors and discoverers, into skilled artisans and scientific 
farmers, into scholars and jurists, into the founders of benevolent 
institutions, and the great expounders of ethical and theological science. 
Id. 
 159. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 144. 
 160. In a similar vein, Hawaii’s Education Clause, enacted shortly after 
Alaska’s in 1959, provides merely a simple statement of the state’s educational 
duty: “The State shall provide for the establishment, support and control of a 
statewide system of public schools free from sectarian control . . . .”  HAW. CONST. 
art. X., §1. 
 161. See VICTOR FISCHER, ALASKA’S CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 140 
(1975). 
 162. Id. The Constitutional Convention began on November 8, 1955, and ended 
on February 6, 1956.  See University of Alaska, Constitutional Convention, 
http://www.alaska.edu/creatingalaska/convention/. 
 163. See id. 
 164. A third goal, inconsequential to the examination in this paper, is clear as 
well: to insulate schools from sectarian control.  See id. 
 165. See Minutes of the Alaska Constitutional Convention, Day 48 (Jan. 9, 
1956), available at http://www.law.state.ak.us/doclibrary/conconv/48.html. 
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purpose of the education system was to prepare Alaskan youth to 
become active participants in society.166 
In the only significant exposition of the meaning of the 
Education Clause, Delegate R. Roland Armstrong, a member of 
the Committee on Health, Education, and Welfare, explained: 
The Convention will note that in Section 1 that the Committee 
has kept a broad concept and has tried to keep our schools 
unshackled by constitutional road blocks. May I draw to your 
attention further the fact that we have used the words “to 
establish and maintain by general law.”  This is a clear directive 
to the legislature to set the machinery in motion in keeping with 
the constitution and whatever future needs may arise.167 
Armstrong’s comments confirm that the Framers delegated to the 
legislature almost full authority over the establishment and 
maintenance of public schools.  The Framers expressly realized 
that “future needs may arise” and that the legislature must have 
the tools to react to the changing environment.168 
The legislative duty to operate public schools, however, had 
limits.  The legislature was to “set the machinery in motion,” but it 
would have to do so “keeping with the constitution.”169  “Keeping 
with the constitution,” of course, applies in any of a number of 
contexts.  In establishing and maintaining the schools, the 
legislature surely had to avoid sectarian control,170 follow the 
Declaration of Rights,171 and respect the division of powers 
between the three branches of government.172  But “keeping with 
the constitution” was an internal reference to the ends that public 
education was supposed to achieve as well.  Ends, indeed, that 
Armstrong expressly recognized just a few sentences later when 
discussing the provision in the Education Clause that prevented 
state funds from directly benefiting religious institutions: “This 
section gives the education department, or other departments, the 
right to seek out the child, independent of his religious affiliation, 
to help him to become a strong and useful part of society wherein it 
touches health and matters of welfare.”173 Armstrong’s comments 
are strong evidence that the Framers shared in the then-
 
 166. See id. 
 167. Id. (emphasis added). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
 171. See ALASKA CONST. art I. 
 172. See ALASKA CONST. art II, III, and IV. 
 173. Minutes of the Alaska Constitutional Convention, Day 48 (Jan. 9, 1956), 
available at http://www.law.state.ak.us/doclibrary/conconv/48.html (emphasis 
added). 
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contemporary view that education’s ultimate purpose was to 
prepare youth to be productive members of society.  In light of this 
understanding, the Framers simple use of “public schools” in the 
Education Clause meant more than just a school house and some 
buses where students convene each day; in their minds, public 
schools were a place where school-age children would have a right 
to become active and productive members of society. 
Taken together, Armstrong’s comments confirm what the 
historical context showed:174 while the legislature certainly had 
broad authority to react to the unique challenges that the pre-
existing segregated system of schools presented, that authority was 
at its outer limits bounded by the students’ right to receive an 
education that would prepare them to become active and 
productive members of society.  This was the adequate education 
that the Framers envisioned each student would receive.  How such 
an education would be offered was certainly a legislative question; 
whether such an education could be offered was a constitutional 
question. 
At the intersection of the legislative and constitutional 
questions is a further question: How specific is the right to 
education in Alaska?  That is, given that Alaska school-age 
children have the right to an education that will prepare them to 
operate productively in society, is there any more specific 
constitutional requirement, such as particular subjects that must be 
taught or a certain quality of instruction that must be offered, with 
which the legislature must comply? 
There are two basic answers to this question: no and yes.  If 
“no,” then an adequate education is one that simply provides each 
child with the tools to succeed in society.  However, the possible 
breadth of this definition is enormous, and judicial conceptions will 
vary widely.  Education in Alaska may, in effect, begin to reflect 
“the policies and priorities of the list-maker rather than the policies 
and priorities of the people.”175 
If “yes,” then the more detailed rights must be found 
somewhere other than the historical context or the minutes of the 
Constitutional Convention, which provide little in the way of 
specifics.  The rest of the Note will therefore be dedicated to 
exploring what, if any, specific rights are guaranteed by the 
Education Clause by examining the final Molly Hootch factor—
contemporary views of education—in light of the constitutional 
values discussed above. 
 
 174. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 175. State’s Trial Brief, supra note 11, at 11 
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C. Contemporary Views of Education 
According to Molly Hootch, the constitution “must be 
construed in light of changing social conditions,” but nonetheless 
may not be interpreted to depart “so far from its original terms and 
meaning as to constitute a radical invasion by the judiciary into an 
area specifically delegated . . . to the legislature.”176  The 
constitution, in other words, is not a static document, but it is not 
completely malleable either; any interpretation must be consistent 
with the principles it establishes.  The specificity of the right to 
education, therefore, may be viewed with an eye toward commonly 
accepted educational standards but only up to the point that those 
standards collide with the legislature’s broad duty to administer the 
public school system. 
It is at this point that the fear expressed by the State in its 
briefs—that the constitutional standard will become a reflection of 
state educational policy177—might become very real, for there is no 
better example of the commonly accepted views on education than 
those enacted by a majority of the people’s representatives.  In 
other words, the temptation may be to rely too heavily on 
education policy to define the constitutional standard.  Molly 
Hootch, however, draws a clear line between legislative 
prerogatives and constitutional standards.178 Indeed, the logic 
behind such a restriction is simple—permitting the legislature to 
effectively define the constitutional standard with its policy choice 
would “constitute a radical invasion by the judiciary into an area 
specifically delegated . . . to the legislature.”179  By calcifying the 
legislature’s transient policy choice into a permanent constitutional 
standard, the judiciary would constrain future policy development 
to the policy choices of today.  Since policy choices, unlike 
constitutional standards, ebb and flow as research develops and 
political parties change, allowing the constitution to be defined by 
present policy would not only be restraining to future policy 
decisions, but it would also be antithetical to democratic 
government. 
To say that policy choices may not define the constitutional 
standard is not, however, to say that current policy choices must be 
ignored completely.  To be sure, the constitution cannot be 
interpreted “in light of changing social conditions” without a clear 
 
 176. Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys. (Molly Hootch), 536 P.2d 793, 
804 (Alaska 1975). 
 177. State’s Trial Brief, supra note 11, at 11. 
 178. Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 804. 
 179. Id. 
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examination of contemporary policy preferences.180  If 
contemporary education policy is to affect the constitutional 
standard at all, then it should magnify those principles that are 
both consistent with the broad constitutional mandate and unlikely 
to change with the political fabric.181  This ensures that the 
constitution is not interpreted either as a static or a completely 
fluid body.182  A brief examination of contemporary views on 
education is necessary to draw out these constitutionally consistent 
and politically resistant principles. 
Contemporary views of education concentrate on setting 
challenging academic standards that every student (and school) 
must meet.183  Standards-based education seeks to teach every 
student in the country basic subjects and skills that are necessary to 
compete in the marketplace.184  In Alaska, it consists of two 
component parts.  First, the state has set a number of goals and 
objectives that the education system is designed to achieve.185  To 
ensure compliance with these broad goals, the State has established 
highly detailed and exhaustive content standards,186 which set 
 
 180. Id. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See id. 
 183. Rebell, supra note 27, at 229; see No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 
U.S.C. § 6301 (2006). 
 184. In the United States, the standards-based movement began in the 1980s 
with a number of reports warning of a “rising tide of mediocrity” in American 
education.  Rebell, supra note 27, at 229.  Pundits and politicians alike warned that 
the United States was falling behind the rest of the world, and that to keep pace in 
the increasingly global economy the United States would have to adapt.  Id.  To 
do so, it was agreed that far more rigorous academic requirements would have to 
be fashioned.  States initially took over the task of adopting standards-based 
education systems, id., with the federal government giving a strong push in 2002 
with the No Child Left Behind Act,  20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006). 
 185. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 04.030.  The Department of Education and 
Early Development’s regulations state that the public school system is “to provide 
a working knowledge of (1) English; (2) mathematics; (3) science; (4) geography; 
(5) history; (6) skills for a healthy life; (7) government and citizenship; (8) fine 
arts; (9) technology; and (10) world languages.”  Id.  The regulations further 
provide that the goal of the public school system is to graduate students who will: 
“(1) communicate effectively; (2) think logically and critically; (3) discover and 
nurture their own creative talents; (4) master essential vocational and 
technological skills; (5) be responsible citizens; (6) be committed to their own 
health and fitness; and (7) accept personal responsibility for sustaining themselves 
economically.  ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 04.020. 
 186. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 04.140.  The regulations adopt by reference 
the content standards, which were most recently published in 2006.  STATE OF 
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curricular goals.187  The content standards are then linked up to 
similarly detailed performance standards in reading, writing, 
mathematics, science, and history.  Students are tested on a yearly 
basis to determine whether they meet the standards, with the 
ultimate goal of proficiency for every student in every school 
regardless of race, ethnicity, or socioeconomic class by 2013-2014.188 
Taken together, content and performance standards exemplify 
the policy thrust of the standards movement: exacting standards 
are articulated and implemented to ensure that every student 
receives a similar education, and therefore similar skills.189  To 
guarantee successful implementation, assessments are administered 
and evaluated in relation to the standards.  Schools must meet the 
standards on a yearly basis, and they are held accountable if they 
fail.190 
At its highest level of abstraction, therefore, the educational 
standards movement in Alaska adopts, as a matter of policy, the 
constitutional right that the Framers contemplated: providing each 
student with the skills necessary to be a productive member of 
society.191  In this light, the standards movement is a particularly 
good place to look for a more specific constitutional standard 
because the educational standards movement essentially amplifies 
the broader constitutional goals.  The specificity of the 
constitutional standard must, however, be determined by 
constitutional principles, not policy.192  In this light, it almost goes 
without saying that the highly specific content and performance 
standards should not be mapped onto the constitutional standard.  
Not only are these standards changed on almost a yearly basis, but 
they are far too inflexible to adapt to the changing social 
environment.  The curriculum necessary to teach in the field of 
technology today, for instance, will inevitably change tomorrow. 
 
ALASKA, DEP’T OF EDUC. & EARLY DEV., ALASKA STANDARDS: CONTENT AND 
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR ALASKA STUDENTS (4th ed. 2006), available at 
http://www.eed.state.ak.us/standards/pdf/standards.pdf. 
 187. For instance, there are five content standards for English/Language Arts.  
Content standard A requires that “[a] student should be able to speak and write 
well for a variety of purposes and audiences.”  STATE OF ALASKA, DEP’T OF EDUC. 
& EARLY DEV., supra note 186, at 11. 
 188. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 06.805. 
 189. Rebell, supra note 27, at 229. 
 190. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (2006) (articulating state standards for receiving 
federal education funds). 
 191. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 192. See Hootch v. State-Operated Sch. Sys. (Molly Hootch), 536 P.2d 793, 804 
(Alaska 1975). 
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Although the specific standards may be unsuitable to rise to 
the level of constitutionality, the compartmentalization of those 
standards into different categories may give a clue as to a more 
suitable constitutional standard.  For instance, mathematics content 
and performance standards are geared toward developing the basic 
skills that each student should have to compete in the marketplace.  
Certainly each skill could not be codified in the constitution, but 
the broader goal—ensuring that every student has mathematics 
skills sufficient to compete in the marketplace—could.  Similarly 
broad skills in English language, science, social studies, technology, 
and vocations could be articulated as well. 
The question therefore remains: Are these abstract skills 
required by the constitution?  In other words, are they both 
consistent with the Framers’ vision of the Education Clause and 
insulated enough from political pressures so that they will not be 
subject to rapid change? 
The Framers, of course, believed that the Education Clause 
conferred both a broad right to education and a legislative duty to 
ensure that the right was met.193  As to the right, and as discussed 
above, at its very core the standards based movement is consistent 
with the Framers’ goal of providing each child with an education 
that would permit him or her to become a productive member of 
society.194  Knowledge in abstract skills, which broadly entail those 
skills a productive member of society must have, are thus not only 
consistent with the Framers’ vision of a right to education but also 
necessary to fulfill the constitutional right.  To this end, subjects 
such as mathematics, reading, and writing have been a touchstone 
of the education system from the beginning, and they are necessary 
for students to go on to college or succeed in other professions.195 
Furthermore, adopting certain abstract skills as a 
constitutional standard is consistent with the Framers’ broad 
delegation of authority to the legislature.  If it is accepted that the 
Framers adopted the Education Clause with the goal of providing 
every child a chance to become a productive member of society, 
the Framers also must have had some conception of the basic 
components of a productive member of society.  Although 
discretion over, for instance, how the skills would be implemented 
is clearly a legislative function,196 the legislature almost certainly 
was not delegated unmitigated control over defining what a student 
 
 193. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 144. 
 196. See Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 804. 
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must learn to receive an adequate education.  The legislature, in 
other words, was delegated significant authority to react and 
change over time, but certain core functions of the educational 
system, such as every student learning basic math, English, and 
science skills, could not be squandered.197 
Moreover, at a conceptual level, it is not incompatible for the 
constitution to require both that the legislature provide school 
children with certain basic skills and to leave the control over that 
content largely to the legislature.  A constitutional floor for the 
skills that must be provided is only inconsistent with a 
constitutional delegation of content to the legislature if the 
constitutionally acceptable skills are defined so specifically that 
they consume the legislature’s clear duty.  For instance, to say that 
the constitution requires a student to learn how to operate both a 
PC and an Apple computer as part of a technology course would 
effectively swallow up the legislature’s authority to control content.  
It is quite different to say that every student must be taught the 
basics of technology that are suitable to prepare them to compete 
in the marketplace.  A broad standard defining basic skills 
therefore channels, rather than shackles, the legislature toward the 
end goals that are contemplated in the constitution.  Far from 
being contradictory, it is in fact complementary: the constitutional 
standard sets the outer limits for the legislature, which then has the 
authority to act within those bounds.198 
A constitutional standard articulated in terms of certain 
abstract skills is not only consistent with the Framers’ articulation 
of a constitutional standard, but it can be insulated from political 
and policy changes as well.  To a large extent, insulating the 
constitutional standard from rapid change depends on which 
abstract skills are merged into the constitution.  It would be hard to 
argue against including, for instance, abstract skills in mathematics, 
language arts, and the sciences in the constitution because these 
subjects have been taught in schools from the beginning and have 
 
 197. Minutes of the Alaska Constitutional Convention, Day 48 (Jan. 9, 1956), 
http://www.law.state.ak.us/doclibrary/conconv/48.html. 
 198. Constitutional standards often broadly delegate authority with limits.  For 
instance, the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution delegates to 
Congress broad authority to regulate commercial activities.  Regulation, however, 
is not boundless; the activity regulated must be “Commerce . . . among the several 
States,” a phrase the United States Supreme Court has inconsistently defined over 
time.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  Notwithstanding this, a legislative body may have 
wide authority while still being checked by broad standards. 
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therefore stood the test of time.199  Other skills, such as “skills for a 
better life” and technology, or vocational education, would have to 
be examined to determine whether they are merely current policy 
preferences or if they broadly embody what an educational system 
must achieve.  It may be argued that technology should be included 
because it is the sine qua non of contemporary education and will 
only become more important over time, while “skills for a better 
life” should not because traditionally it has been the function of the 
family unit and therefore evinces a policy choice away from 
tradition that may change as the political and social climate adapts.  
Whatever the choice, it is clear that certain abstract skills can be 
chosen that will be insulated from both political and policy change 
and therefore will serve properly to channel legislative choice. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In attempting to shed light on the adequacy question in 
Alaska, there are two conclusions.  The first deals with method, or 
the correct way to approach determining adequacy.  An adequacy 
standard should be found, if at all, by utilizing an Alaska-specific 
approach.  The task after all is to interpret Alaska’s Education 
Clause—not North Carolina’s or Kentucky’s or Arizona’s—and 
therefore the solution should be derived from Alaskan 
constitutional principles and not the decisions by courts in those 
other states. 
The far more contentious conclusion is that there is an 
adequacy standard in the Education Clause.  The text of the 
Education Clause, the history of its formation, and the 
contemporary necessities of education in Alaska lead to the 
conclusion that the Education Clause does promise every student 
in Alaska an adequate education.  This is a contentious conclusion 
because it is by no means the only conclusion.  The simple words, 
“[t]he legislature shall by general law establish and maintain a 
system of public schools open to all children of the State,”200 say 
nothing about adequacy; the Framers never expressly stated that 
the constitution promises every child an adequate education; and 
contemporary necessities are, at least in many people’s perspective, 
irrelevant in constitutional interpretation.  There is no clear 
answer. 
 
 199. See, e.g., The Massachusetts Law of 1647, AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 
28 (6th ed. 2005) (“It is therefore ord’ed . . . to teach all such children as shall 
resort to him to write & reade . . . .”). 
 200. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
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However, there is a clear point to be made from this 
uncertainty: methods are important in determining outcomes.  
Another may view the plain text of the Education Clause as 
dispositive of adequacy.  Whatever the choice, how one approaches 
interpretation will inevitably lead to what he or she interprets.  
Hence, a proper solution must be a combination of method and 
outcome.  However the court chooses to interpret the constitution, 
it must do so with issues particular to Alaska and a solution specific 
to the state in mind. 
